Most of us, somewhere back in the receding memories of our education, were exposed to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, that iconic game theoretic formulation that introduced us to the idea of a public good. If we learned this in an economics class, we were led to believe that cooperation was not possible in the long-term and that life was “red in tooth and claw” and necessarily “nasty, brutish, and short,” at least without the intervention of privatization or external regulation, the Hobbesian notion the codification of which was partially responsible for John Nash’s Nobel Prize. But many of us looked around with worried looks and whispered amongst ourselves because we knew that this was not consistent with how we saw people behave in the real world.
Now, we didn’t remain idealistic for long. You don’t have to look very far to find plenty of uncooperative, selfish, out-only-for-themselves people living amongst us who know the wisdom of prosociality. And in our most honest moments, we could admit that we are sometimes guilty of selfishness ourselves. But we clung to the hope that we might be able to create conditions under which the best of people might emerge, where their natural tendency to cooperate would be promoted.
Recently, we have found redemption. In 2009, Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist at Indiana University, became the first woman to win the Nobel Prize for Economics. She has devoted her career to studying the conditions under which the tragedy of the commons is averted; conditions that allow groups to manage shared resources for themselves; conditions, in short, that promote collective action. Lin’s scholarship is daunting by itself, and the broader literature on collective action and public goods larger still, but at a recent conference, I had the good fortune to spend time with David Sloan Wilson, the prominent evolutionary biologist, who has taken notice of Lin’s work and is integrating it with his own. As David pointed out in our discussions, Lin’s decades of field work, in many different contexts, can be boiled down to eight essential ingredients, a “recipe,” if you will, for collective action:
Clearly Defined Boundaries. The identity of the group and its rights to the common resource must be clearly delineated.
Proportional Equivalence between Benefits and Costs. Members of the group must negotiate a system that rewards members for their contributions. High status and other disproportionate benefits must be earned.
Collective-Choice Arrangements. Group members must be able to create their own rules and make their own decisions by consensus. People hate being told what to do but will work hard for group goals that they have agreed upon.
Monitoring. Managing a commons is inherently vulnerable to free-riding and active exploitation. Unless these locally advantageous strategies can be detected at relatively low cost, the tragedy of the commons will occur.
Graduated Sanctions. Transgressions need not require heavy-handed punishment, at least initially. Often gossip or a gentle reminder is sufficient, but more severe forms of punishment must also be waiting in the wings for use when necessary.
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms. It must be possible to resolve conflicts quickly and in ways that are perceived as fair by members of the group.
Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize. Groups must have the authority to manage their own affairs. Externally imposed rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstances and violate Ingredient Three.
Small, Multi-Layer Groups. For groups that are part of larger social systems, there must be nested enterprises. The previous ingredients work best in relatively small groups. Society at a larger scale must be multicellular, with groups interacting with groups, often in multiple layers.
(Adapted from David’s blog, Evolution for Everyone, at http://scienceblogs.com/evolution). The extent of the literature demonstrating the applicability of these ingredients to all sorts of groups is overwhelming and some careful thought will reveal that they apply to most, if not all, of the social groups we encounter. But don’t take my word for it, David is putting Lin’s recipe into action.
In the Binghamton Neighborhood Project, (http://bnp.binghamton.edu), David is putting social science theory to work, collaborating with community partners to improve human welfare, one neighborhood at a time. The collaboration helps community groups coalesce around Lin’s principles in a way that greatly enhances the likelihood that neighborhoods will develop a sense of shared destiny and will work together to make life better for everyone. The possibilities are numerous, but their current focus is on what they call the “Design Your Own Park” project which is empowering neighborhood groups to turn vacant lots and neglected spaces into public parks of their own design. Beyond the obvious benefits of safe, outdoor play spaces, and venues for neighborhood events, the planning process requires broad-scale interaction and on-going shared responsibility within a framework that produces the social capital so critical for collective action, but so often missing from the neighborhoods in which we live. Nobel-Prize-quality theory meets boots-on-the-ground practice. Imagine that.